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1Abstract
This paper examines how unionisation structures that diﬀer in the degree of
wage centralisation aﬀect ﬁrms’ incentives to increase labour productivity. We
distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation.
(1) “Decentralisation” where wages are determined independently at the ﬁrm-
level, (2) “coordination” where an industry union sets individual wages for all
ﬁrms at the ﬁrm-level, and (3) “centralisation” where a uniform wage rate is set
for the entire industry. We show that ﬁrms’ investment incentives are largest
under complete centralisation. However, investment incentives are non-monotone
in the degree of centralisation so that “decentralisation” carries higher investment
incentives than “coordination.” Depending on the innovation outcome, workers’
wage bill is maximised under “centralisation” if ﬁrms’ productivity diﬀerences
remain small. Otherwise, workers prefer an intermediate degree of centralisation,
which holds innovative activity down at its lowest level. Labour market policy can
spur innovation by either decentralising unionisation structures or by imposing
non-discrimination rules on monopoly unions.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D43, J50, K31, L13.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
How unions aﬀect ﬁrms’ performance, innovation and labour productivity is a highly
controversial issue (for a survey see, e.g., Flanagan 1999). On the one hand, unions are
argued to hurt ﬁrms as unionisation may increase wage demands and, thereby, ﬁrms’
labour costs (see, e.g., Oswald 1985, Farber 1986, or Hirsch 1991). On the other hand,
unions are regarded as part of a constructive labour market regime which smoothens
industrial relations, thereby promoting labour productivity and lowering average costs
(see Freeman and Medoﬀ 1984). In general though, it is not the mere existence of unions
that is decisive for ﬁrms’ performance, but rather the speciﬁc mode of labour market
organisation (see Calmfors and Driﬃll 1988, Soskice 1990, and Layard et al. 1991).
Wage setting diﬀers substantially between countries.1 A salient dimension that dif-
ferentiates national unionisation structures is the degree of wage-setting centralisation
(see, e.g., Calmfors and Driﬃll 1988, Moene and Wallerstein 1997, Flanagan 1999, and
Wallerstein 1999).2 At the industry level, a decentralised wage setting structure is com-
monly contrasted with a completely centralised wage setting structure. While in the
former case, wages are set between a single employer and a ﬁrm-level union, in the latter
case an industry union negotiates a standard wage for the entire industry.
Among the diﬀerent modes of labour market organisation, the more centralised
labour market institutions have come under attack in the policy debate over labour
market organisation and economic performance. A commonly held view is that wage
rigidities that do not account for local conditions are generally bad for overall economic
performance (see, for example, Nickell 1997 and Siebert 1997), so that any move to-
wards more decentralised, and hence, more ﬂexible structures is good for the economy.
Consistent with this view, the OECD Jobs Study (OECD 1996, p. 15) recommends to
“make wage and labour costs more ﬂexible by removing restrictions that prevent wages
1As labour market organisation diﬀers substantially between countries, regions, and industries, there
exists a large literature about the possible key characteristics that are crucial for the relative perfor-
mance of diﬀerent modes of labour market organisation. For comparisons of countries’ labour market
institutions see, e.g., Nickell (1997), OECD (1997, chapter 3), Blau and Kahn (1999), and Wallerstein
(1999).
2The notion of centralisation has been used by Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) to argue that diﬀerences
in national unionisation structures can explain macroeconomic performance. In their work the notion
of centralisation refers to the degree to which coalitions are created across unions, ﬁrms or industries.
Accordingly, enterprise wage-setting between one ﬁrm and its respective union is the most decentralised
form of a (collective) wage agreement, while wage centralisation increases the more ﬁrms a single union
can bring under a single wage-tariﬀ agreement where complete centralisation is reached if the entire
economy falls under the collective wage agreement. In contrast to this approach, we will conﬁne our
analysis to the industry level.
3from reﬂecting local conditions (...).”
Given this policy recommendation, tendencies to introduce more ﬂexibility into cen-
tralised wage systems have given rise to intermediate structures, where wage setting
remains highly coordinated at the industry level but where adjustments to local condi-
tions can be made at the ﬁrm-level as well. For example, in Germany collective wage
agreements between industry unions and employer associations have started to con-
tain so-called “opting out clauses” according to which ﬁrms are allowed to pay wages
below the collectively agreed rate if they face economic hardships.3 Moreover, even
wage-setting under the auspices of an industry union can allow for considerable wage
diﬀerentials between ﬁrms.4 Trends towards less centralised wage setting institutions
can also be observed in other countries as, e.g., Denmark, Sweden, Australia, or New
Zealand.5
Motivated by these tendencies towards more ﬂexible wage setting regimes at the
industry level, this paper examines two related questions. Firstly, how do various union-
isation structures that diﬀer with respect to wage centralisation aﬀect ﬁrms’ incentives
for implementing labour productivity enhancing technologies? And secondly, what are
the conditions under which workers prefer wage setting to be completely centralised, and
when do workers prefer more ﬂexible wage setting regimes?
Most of the existing theoretical work on the relationship between unionisation and
innovative activity has focused on how a union’s bargaining power and its objectives
aﬀect ﬁrms’ investment for labour cost reduction. Following the seminal work by Grout
(1984), the conventional wisdom has been that a ﬁrm’s incentives are decreasing with
union bargaining power because of the union’s hold-up incentive to raise its wage de-
mands after investments are sunk. As this reduces the ﬁrm’s expected return on invest-
ment, unionisation will reduce investment incentives (see also Malcomson 1997). More
recent work by Tauman and Weiss (1987) and Ulph and Ulph (1994, 2001) has qualiﬁed
this underinvestment result by considering oligopolistic competition between ﬁrms in
3See Sachverständigenrat (1998, pp. 117-127) where “wage ﬂexibility clauses” of recent industry-wide
tariﬀ agreements in Germany are summarised. One example is the 1997 collective wage agreement for
the construction industry in eastern Germany, according to which companies may reduce the collectively
agreed wage by up to 10 percent.
4See Büttner and Fitzenberger (1998) for wage dispersion under industry-wide wage setting in Ger-
many.
5For a country-wise survey of recent trends towards more ﬂexible wage setting system see, e.g.,
Katz (1993). For the Australian case see in particular Wailes and Lansbury (1999). The breakdown of
centralised wage bargaining in Denmark and Sweden is documented in Iverson (1996). The Swedish case
is also studied extensively in Hibbs and Locking (2000). For the period 1950-1992, a more conservative
view is expressed in Wallerstein et al. (1997).
4the ﬁnal goods market (for a survey see Ulph and Ulph 1998).6
This literature has focused exclusively on ﬁrm-level unionisation, i.e., one polar case
w h e r ew a g e sa r es e ta tt h eﬁrm-level by independent unions. Hence, the relative perfor-
mance of more centralised wage setting systems remains an open issue, even though the
degree of wage centralisation has been identiﬁed as a crucial feature of diﬀerent unioni-
sation structures. Our focus is, therefore, on diﬀerent unionisation structures and how
they aﬀect ﬁrms’ incentives to undertake labour productivity enhancing investments.
Moreover, we also analyse workers’ preferences for diﬀerent unionisation structures.
More precisely, we introduce a unionised oligopoly model, where ﬁrms decide about
productivity enhancing investments in the ﬁrst stage, labour unions determine wages
in the second stage, and ﬁnally, ﬁrms compete in Cournot fashion on the product mar-
ket. We compare three unionisation structures with “decentralised,” “coordinated,” and
“centralised” wage setting. Under the decentralised structure wages are determined at
the ﬁrm-level without coordination among unions. In contrast, under centralisation an
industry-union sets one uniform wage tariﬀ for all ﬁrms across the entire industry. Cen-
tralisation at an intermediate level implies industry-wide coordination on the union’s
side, but at the same time it allows for adjustments at the ﬁrm-level. As we will show
the (interﬁrm) wage diﬀerentials can be ordered according to the degree of centralisa-
tion. Wage dispersion is completely compressed under centralised wage setting while it is
largest under a decentralised wage structure. At the intermediate level of centralisation
the wage diﬀerential lies in between those polar cases.
Concerning ﬁrms’ investment incentives, we show that a uniform wage rule acts as an
insurance device that protects ﬁrms’ investments against opportunistic wage demands.
The intuition for this result can be gained by contrasting centralised wage setting with
t h ei n t e r m e d i a t ec a s ew h e r eﬁrm-level unions coordinate in setting a diﬀerentiated wage
proﬁle. Suppose that initially two ﬁrms are in the industry and that both ﬁrms are
symmetric. If now one ﬁrm increases its labour productivity, industry wage-bill maximi-
sation implies a diﬀerentiated wage proﬁl e ,w h e r et h em o r ee ﬃcient ﬁrm pays a higher
wage than the less eﬃcient ﬁrm. Consequently, an “equal pay for equal work policy”
constrains the union’s wage demand, as any wage increase is now also imposed on the
less productive ﬁrm. As a result, an innovative ﬁrm can appropriate more of the rent
when wage setting is centralised.
6For example, Tauman and Weiss (1987) consider a duopoly where only one ﬁrm is unionised. As
the unionised ﬁrm faces a higher wage level it also can have larger incentives to invest. In Ulph and
Ulph (2001) union strength can increase a ﬁrm’s innovative eﬀort under eﬃcient bargaining, if the union
cares a lot about employment (and not so much about wages). With Cournot competition in the ﬁnal
good market an increase in the ﬁrm’s productivity will then mainly cause the rival ﬁrm to cut back its
output level which increases the unionised ﬁrm’s proﬁts, and hence, its innovation incentives.
5In contrast, decentralised structures allow for ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage adjustments that
give rise to diﬀerentiated wage-proﬁles which increase the union’s scope for appropriat-
ing some of the rent from the ﬁrms’ speciﬁc investments. As a consequence, we show
that ﬁrms undertake more costly investments if wage-setting is completely centralised.
Hence, labour productivity is higher under complete centralisation than under more
decentralised unionisation structures.
Next we show that workers can be better oﬀ adopting a centralised unionisation
structure, as this increases ﬁrms’ investment incentives which in turn can boost wage
revenues. However, if technological progress results in very asymmetric outcomes where
successful innovators obtain a large competitive advantage over their rivals, workers tend
to prefer coordinated wage setting with wage ﬂexibility at the ﬁrm-level.
We also compare investment incentives under unionised labour markets with a per-
fectly competitive labour market. A centralised unionisation structure can either lead
to stronger or weaker investment incentives than a perfectly competitive labour market,
depending on workers’ reservation wage. In contrast, if wages are ﬂexible at the ﬁrm
level, investment incentives are always lower compared to perfectly competitive labour
markets. Finally, we discuss policy issues that accrue from recent trends towards more
ﬂexible tariﬀ settlements, as provided by so-called “opting out clauses”.
While our paper contributes to the theory of innovation in unionised oligopolies,
the dynamic eﬃciency eﬀects of non-discriminatory pricing rules for monopolistically
supplied inputs on downstream ﬁrms’ investment incentives have been analysed, for
example, in DeGraba (1990). However, as this literature focuses on the normative issue
of monopolistic input supplier regulation, it neither deals with decentralised supply
structures nor does it provide a positive analysis of the stability of diﬀerent supply
structures.
Finally, our work is related to arguments which have been put forward in the Swedish
debate over “solidaristic” bargaining (see Rehn 1952) that have been recently formalised
in Agell and Lommerud (1993) and Moene and Wallerstein (1997). According to this
literature, nation-wide wage settlements that are associated with a high degree of wage
equality drive out ineﬃcient ﬁrms, expedite structural change, and thereby, foster growth.
In contrast, our analysis focuses on the role of diﬀerent unionisation structures to over-
come the hold-up problem associated with unionisation in oligopolistic industries.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model’s
structure and deﬁne diﬀerent unionisation structures. We solve the model for the static
case where ﬁrms’ productivity levels are given in Section 3. Section 4 solves for ﬁrms’
investment incentives and analyses workers’ preferred unionisation structure and com-
pares our results to investment incentives with perfectly competitive labour markets.
6In Section 5 we discuss implications for labour market policy, and ﬁnally, Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model and Unionisation Structures
Consider a homogeneous goods Cournot duopoly, where ﬁrms are indexed by i =1 ,2.
Both ﬁrms operate under constant returns to scale, with labour being the only factor of
production. To produce a unit of the ﬁnal good, ﬁrm i requires αi units of a single input
of homogeneous labour, where αi is ﬁrm i’s input-output coeﬃcient. Denoting wages at
ﬁrm i by wi, ﬁrm i’s marginal cost is then given by αiwi.L e tqi denote the quantity of
the ﬁnal good produced by ﬁrm i,a n dl e txi be its labour demand. Since ﬁrm i requires
αi units of labour per unit of output, we have xi = qiαi. We assume a linear inverse
demand function of the standard form p = A − q1 − q2.
Initially, i.e., before any cost-reducing investment is undertaken, both ﬁrms have
the same labour productivity, α1 = α2, which we normalise to unity. However, ﬁrm 1
has the opportunity to undertake a labour-saving investment project which decreases
its labour requirement per unit of output by ∆,w i t h0 < ∆ < α1.7 We denote a
labour-saving investment project by I(∆),w h e r eI is the cost for increasing labour
productivity from 1/α1 to 1/(α1−∆). We suppose that the investment increases labour
productivity instantaneously and is perfectly protected against imitation. As I is the
amount that has to be sunk in order to implement a productivity enhancing technology,
it also measures how severe the hold-up problem is that ﬁrm 1 faces under unionisation.
If an investment project does not involve any speciﬁc investment, then I is zero and,
accordingly, the hold-up problem vanishes. Conversely, as I becomes larger the hold-
up problem becomes more severe, and labour market organisation becomes a critical
determinant of ﬁrms’ investment incentives.
The opportunity cost of labour, given through the workers’ outside option such as
their alternative income, is denoted by w0,w i t h0 <w 0 <A . It is assumed that the
union maximises its members’ wage bill relative to the opportunity cost of labour, and
we adopt the right-to-manage assumption: The union(s) can set the wage while each
ﬁrm retains the right to choose its employment level.8
7Our assumption that only one ﬁrm has the opportunity to undertake cost-reducing investment
follows Bester and Petrakis (1993). It is also consistent with the patent tournament model of Ulph and
Ulph (1998) where only one ﬁrm ends up as the exclusive patent right holder.
8In contrast to the right-to-manage assumption eﬃcient bargaining models assume that unions and
ﬁrms bargain over both wages and ﬁrms’ employment levels (Oswald and Turnbull 1985, Layard et al.
1991, and Booth 1995). While it is true that unions rarely set wages unilaterally and they also do not
only care about wages, these simplifying assumption allow us to extract unions’ incentives to exercise
7We consider a three stage game with the following timing: In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 1
decides whether or not to undertake a given investment project, I(∆), that reduces ﬁrm
1’s input-output-ratio by ∆ at a cost of I. In the second stage, wages are determined,
where we distinguish the three unionisation structures ρ = D,C,U with the following
properties:
1. Decentralisation (ρ = D): There are two ﬁrm-level unions which set ﬁrm-level
wages w1 and w2 for their ﬁr m so nb e h a l fo ft h er e s p e c t i v eﬁrm’s employees. The
two unions choose their wage demands simultaneously and noncooperatively.
2. Coordination (ρ = C): An industry union coordinates the wage demands w1 and
w2 so as to maximise the industry wage bill.
3. Centralisation (ρ = U): There is one industry-wide union which sets a uniform
industry wage w for both ﬁrms so as to maximise the industry wage bill.
Finally, in the third stage of the game the two ﬁrms compete in quantities, taking
productivity levels and wage rates as given.
This timing of the game is intended to reﬂect the planning horison usually associated
with the respective decisions. Investment decisions are mostly long-run while wage
contracts are usually negotiated for a much shorter time horison, and product market
quantities can usually be adjusted on an even shorter basis.
The three unionisation structures diﬀer with respect to the degree of centralisation
in the following way: The D-regime can be viewed as the most decentralised system of
collective wage setting, where ﬁrm-level unions do not cooperate and set ﬁrm-speciﬁc
wages depending on the relative eﬃciency of their employer. In contrast, the U-regime
stands for the most centralised wage setting system, as labour supply is perfectly monop-
olised and the industry union determines one uniform wage for all ﬁrms in the industry.9
The C-regime lies in between those polar cases. On the one hand labour supply is com-
pletely monopolised, as an industry union coordinates wage demands at the ﬁrm level.
On the other hand ﬁrm-level wages are adjustable to the ﬁrms’ relative competitiveness.
Consequently, diﬀerent wages are likely to prevail in this case.10
At this point two remarks are at hand: Firstly, our notion of centralisation requires
either an industry union or intense coordination among ﬁrm-level unions. Secondly,
self-restraints as in the form of the “equal pay for equal work” commitment.
9This regime embodies the famous union-slogan “Equal pay for equal work.”
10The C-regime stands for recent trends in continental Europe, where monopoly unions bargain over
industry wage proﬁles that allow for more ﬂexibility at the ﬁrm-level and for opting-out clauses for less
eﬃcient ﬁrms that are otherwise bound to the tariﬀ-agreement (for recent trends see also OECD 1997).
8the diﬀerent labour market regimes also diﬀer in terms of (inter-ﬁrm) wage ﬂexibility.
While neither regime D nor C imposes any restriction on wage ﬂexibility the uniform
wage setting regime U completely depresses any wage diﬀerential between ﬁrms. Hence,
we portray centralisation as a multidimensional concept.
Before we compare the diﬀerent regimes, let us introduce the following assumption
in order to exclude corner solutions in which the non-innovating ﬁrm is driven out of
the market.11
Assumption 1. The investment projects under consideration lead to non-drastic
productivity improvements in the sense that the union prefers the less eﬃcient ﬁrm to
remain active in the market even under the centralised wage-setting regime U; i.e.,
w0 < w0(∆) ≡
(1 − 3∆)A
1 − ∆2 , (1)
which implies that we restrict attention to productivity increases ∆ < 1/3.
Assumption 1 ensures that all optimisation problems in the second and third stage
of the game stay globally concave. We maintain Assumption 1 throughout the rest of
the paper.
3 The Static Case: Given Productivity Levels
Let us begin our analysis by solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium quantities and
wages, taking ﬁrms’ productivity levels as given. Firm 1’s proﬁt function is
Π1 =( A − q1 − q2)q1 − w1(1 − ∆)q1,
and ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts are given by
Π2 =( A − q1 − q2)q2 − w2q2.
For given wages w1 and w2,t h eﬁrms’ subgame perfect strategies are
q1(w1,w 2,∆)=




A − 2w2 + w1(1 − ∆)
3
.( 3 )
Now turn to the wage-setting stage. Wage-bill maximisation implies that the union’s
optimal wage setting strategy, w
ρ
i, regarding ﬁrm i is deﬁned as
w
ρ






j) for i =1 ,2, i 6= j,
11Assumption 1 is derived in the Appendix. Similar restrictions are also employed in Bester and
Petrakis (1993) and Ulph and Ulph (1994, 1998, 2001).
9for regimes ρ = U,C,D where UD
i = xi(wi − w0), UC
i =
P2
i=1 xi(wi − w0),a n dUU
i =
P2
i=1 xi(w − w0) for the respective regimes, where labour demands xi are derived from
equations (2) and (3). Lemma 1 and 2 summarise our results concerning equilibrium
wages and quantities.
Lemma 1. For the diﬀerent unionisation structures the equilibrium wages are as
follows:













(iii) Centralisation (U): wU =
(2−∆)A+2w0(1−∆+∆2)
4(1−∆+∆2) for i =1 ,2.
Substitution of the equilibrium wages into equations (2) and (3) gives the ﬁrms’
equilibrium output levels.
Lemma 2. Under the diﬀerent unionisation structures ρ = D,C,U the equilibrium
production quantities for ﬁr m1a n d2a r ea sf o l l o w s :
q
D
1 =2 ( 5 A − w0(5 − 7∆))/45 and q
D
2 =2( 5 A − w0(5 + 2∆))/45,
q
C
1 =( A − w0(1 − 2∆))/6 and q
C














4(1 − ∆ + ∆2)
.






2,a c r o s st h et h r e ed i ﬀerent regimes, we obtain the following
ordering:






2, under the diﬀerent unionisation structures is as follows:
(i) Firm 1’s wages: wC
1 >w U >w D
1 .
(ii) Firm 2’s wages: wU >w C
2 >w D
2 .




Corollary 1 shows how wage-setting depends on the particular mode of unionisation.
Decentralised wage-setting leads to the lowest wage levels compared to more centralised
structures. Under coordinated wage-setting without a uniformity rule (ρ = C)ap o s -
itive wage-diﬀerential results where the eﬃcient ﬁrm pays the highest wage. However,
the wage-diﬀerential under regime C is lower than under system D. The ordering of the
wage diﬀerentials mirrows our notion of wage-setting centralisation as discussed above.
Wage-setting under the completely decentralised regime D is most responsive to ﬁrms’
characteristics, so that productivity diﬀerences between ﬁrms translate into the largest
wage diﬀerentials. On the other side of the spectrum, centralised wage setting under
10regime U depresses any heterogeneity in the wage-setting process so that wage diﬀeren-
tials vanish.12
The ordering of wage diﬀerentials under the unionisation structures mirrors the em-
pirical ﬁnding that wage dispersion is negatively correlated with wage centralisation,
which is documented in OECD (1997), Flanagan (1999), and Wallerstein (1999). Inter-
estingly, even though the intermediate regime C and the decentralised regime D both
allow for full ﬂexibility at the ﬁrm-level, the wage proﬁle is more compressed under
regime C than under D. This is because under decentralised wage setting the high-cost
ﬁrm’s union is willing to accept a lower wage in order to restall its ﬁrm’s competitiveness
on the product market. In contrast, an industry union fully internalises the negative
“business stealing” externality of this policy. Hence, under a coordinated wage setting
regime (C) the union’s incentive to adjust ﬁrm 2’s wage to a lower level in response to
an increase in ﬁrm 1’s productivity is much weaker.13
From Corollary 1, we can also gain further insights how the severity of the hold-up
problem that ﬁrm 1 faces varies under the three unionisation structures. Noting that
Πi = q2





(A − w1(1 − 2∆) − dw)
2 .( 4 )
This expression of ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts allows us to identify two diﬀerent hold-up eﬀects.
Firstly, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts are being reduced as the wage level, w1, increases, and secondly,
proﬁts decrease as the wage diﬀerential between the two ﬁrms widens. Hence, there are
two kinds of hold-up:
1. Wage-level hold-up: An increase in ﬁrm 1’s wage level - while holding the wage dif-
ferential constant - unambiguously reduces the gains from innovation;
∂Π1/∂w1 < 0.
2. Wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up: An increase in the wage diﬀerential - while holding
ﬁrm 1’s wage level constant - unambiguously reduces the gains from innovation;
i.e. ∂Π1/∂dw < 0.
While the ﬁrst kind of hold-up has received some attention in the respective literature,
the second way of rent extraction seems to be much less recognised. From Corollary 1
we see that the wage-level hold-up is largest under the C regime and lowest under the
12It should be noted that centralised wage agreements often establish wage ﬂoors where ﬁrms may
decide to pay higher wages. This may be explained by eﬃciency wage considerations or other frictions
in labour market contracting that are beyond the scope of this paper.
13From Lemma 1 it follows that ∂wD
2 /∂∆ < ∂wC
2 /∂∆.
11D regime. This ordering may suggest that decentralised wage-setting is the mode of
labour market organisation that is most conducive to innovation. However, as part
(iii) of Corollary 1 reveals, decentralised wage-setting also involves the largest hold-up
potential via wage-diﬀerentiation. This may counter the positive eﬀects of lower wage
levels on incentives to invest.
Comparison of regimes C and U shows that both the wage level and the wage diﬀer-
ential are strictly lower under regime U than under C. Hence, the uniformity rule under
centralised wage setting restricts the union’s hold-up potential and, therefore, induces
larger investment incentives. Comparison with the decentralised wage-setting regime,
however, remains ambiguous so far. While under regime D the wage level is the lowest,
it also involves the largest scope for hold-up by wage diﬀerentiation.
Before turning to ﬁrms’ investment decisions, let us ask which unionisation structure
workers prefer in the short run, i.e. in the absence of innovation. Unsurprisingly, workers
prefer an unconstrained monopoly union over both a constrained monopoly union (U) or
a fragmented unionisation structure (D) since under regime C the unconstrained wage
bill maximum can be implemented. We can, therefore, state the following result:
Proposition 1. In the short run (where ﬁrms’ productivity levels are given), the
wage bill is maximised under regime C if ∆ > 0.
As will become clear in the next section, workers’ preferences are likely to change
when ﬁrms’ investment incentives are taken into account.
4 The Dynamic Case: Productivity Improvements
4.1 Investment Incentives
Incentives to invest depend on how innovation aﬀects ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Hence, we need
to analyse how ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts change with a productivity enhancing investment under
diﬀerent modes of labour market organisation.
T h ei n c r e a s ei nﬁrm 1’s proﬁt gives us the maximum expenditure on productivity





with ρ = D,C,U,w h e r eΠ1(∆) is ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium proﬁti fag i v e ni n v e s t m e n t
project I(∆) is undertaken, and Π1(0) stands for ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium proﬁti fi td o e s
not carry out the investment project.14,15 The following proposition states the main
14In the following the argument “∆” describes the investment case and the argument “0” stands for
the no-investment case.
15Note that comparing only the marginal incentives to invest (i.e. comparing ∂Πρ/∂∆ for ρ = D,C,U)
would be misleading since ﬁrm 1’s reduced proﬁt function is not concave in ∆.
12result regarding ﬁrm 1’s investment incentives:
Proposition 2. Innovation incentives are largest under unionisation structure U
and smallest under unionisation structure C; i.e. IU >I D >I C.
Proof. See Appendix.
Before commenting on Proposition 2, let us shortly digress to the literature on patent
tournaments under unionisation in order to link our results more closely to the existing
literature (most importantly, to Ulph and Ulph 1998). In a patent tournament ﬁrm i
is granted a license for a new technology if ﬁrm j does not purchase it. In this case,
the competitive threat faced by ﬁrm 1 is diﬀerent, as ﬁrm 2 will have the competitive
advantage should ﬁrm 1 decide not to purchase the patent. Hence, ﬁrm 1’s reservation
price for obtaining the patent, Pρ,i sg i v e nb yt h ed i ﬀerence in proﬁts between the




1(−∆),w h e r eΠ
ρ
1(∆) stands for
ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium proﬁts if it obtains the exclusive right to use the patented technology.
Accordingly, Π
ρ
1(−∆) is ﬁrm 1’s proﬁti ft h er i v a lﬁrm 2 receives the patent. Comparison
of the diﬀerent regimes shows that the ordering obtained in Proposition 2 is preserved
in a patent tournament.
Proposition 3. The ﬁrms’ reservation prices for the patented innovation are largest
under unionisation structure U and smallest under structure C; i.e. PU >PD >P C.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition (2) and (3) show that diﬀerent unionisation structures have diﬀerent
eﬀects on investment incentives. Our ordering of unionisation structures along the di-
mension of wage centralisation shows that a completely centralised wage-setting system
carries the largest investment incentives. Furthermore, the relationship between wage
centralisation and innovative activity is non-monotone. Investment incentives are low-
est when centralisation is intermediate; i.e. if an industry union can diﬀerentiate wage
demands across ﬁrms. This means that while the wage-diﬀerentiation hold-up is less
severe under intermediate centralisation than under decentralisation (as the wage struc-
ture is more compressed), the magnitude of the wage-level hold-up under intermediate
centralisation outweighs this. Hence, the hold-up is larger in total under intermedi-
ate centralisation, so that intermediate centralisation has the most negative eﬀects on
investment incentives among the three regimes.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding has important implications for empirical work on the relationship
between unionisation and productivity or innovation.16 While much of the existing work
16Starting with the seminal work of Brown and Medoﬀ (1978) there is a large body of empirical
literature studying the eﬀects of unionisation on productivity and innovation (see, e.g., Freeman and
13focuses on union coverage and union density as measures of unionisation, our results
indicate that wage centralisation can also signiﬁcantly aﬀect ﬁrms’ innovative behavior.
Our second ﬁnding, namely that investment incentives are non-monotone with re-
spect to centralisation, calls for a critical reassessment of recent trends towards more
ﬂexibility in industry-wide wage settlements. As those agreements often remain highly
coordinated on the union’s side our results indicate that ﬂexibility can also adversely
aﬀect innovation incentives while the desired positive eﬀects on employment may re-
main small or even negligible as long as labour supply remains monopolised. Before we
elaborate on this issue in Section 5, let us ﬁrst analyse which regime workers actually
prefer.
4.2 Workers’ Preferred Unionisation Structure
Given that investment incentives are strongest under the least ﬂexible wage setting
regime (U), the question arises which unionisation structure would arise endogenously
if workers could decide which one to adopt. As demonstrated in the next proposition,
while coordinated wage setting can also be optimal, dynamic considerations may lead
workers to prefer a uniform wage setting regime.
Proposition 4. In the long run, the wage-bill maximising unionisation structure
depends on I(∆),w i t h∆ > 0,a sf o l l o w s :
(i) If I(∆) is undertaken under all regimes (I(∆) <I C), then workers prefer regime
C.
(ii) For IC <I (∆) <I U there exists a threshold value e ∆(w0) s u c ht h a tt h ew a g eb i l l
is maximised under regime U if ∆ < e ∆(w0) and under regime C if ∆ > e ∆(w0).T h e
threshold value e ∆(w0) is increasing in w0.
(iii) If the investment project is not undertaken under any regime, i.e., IU <I (∆),
then workers are indiﬀerent between regimes C and U.
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (ii) of Proposition 4 states that workers may strictly prefer a completely cen-
tralised unionisation structure (U) in order to provide a credible commitment against
opportunistic wage adjustments, thereby inducing investment that would not have oc-
curred otherwise. If, however, the relevant investment projects lead to large asymmetries
Medoﬀ 1984, Connolly et al. 1986, Addison and Hirsch 1989, Hirsch 1991, Bronas and Deere 1993,
Addison and Wagner 1994). For a recent survey see Menezes-Filho et al. (1998). All in all the
empirical results are mixed; there is no unambiguous relation between union power (measured by union
density or union coverage) and productivity enhancing activities.
14between ﬁrms, workers will prefer the same regime ex ante as ex post, namely coordi-
nated wage setting (C). Hence, our model may also help to explain why trends may
emerge away from highly centralised unionisation structures towards more ﬂexible wage
setting regimes: As ﬁrms’ innovative activities lead to “more asymmetric” outcomes,
unions are more inclined to allow for ﬁrm-level adjustments in wage formation. While
it seems to be a widely held belief that declining union density and increasing man-
agement or shareholder power are the driving forces behind the erosion of centralised
systems, Proposition 4 identiﬁes reasonable conditions under which unions themselves
will support those tendencies.17 In particular, when innovations become more drastic so
that market outcomes become more asymmetric, unions are more likely to refrain from
uniformity commitments.
4.3 Comparison with Perfectly Competitive Labour Markets
Since in policy debates over labour market reform it is often argued that policy makers
should take a more active role in introducing more labour market ﬂexibility, it is useful
to relate our results to the benchmark case of perfectly competitive labour markets
where unionisation is completely suppressed. Comparing our three regimes to a perfectly
competitive labour market (under a product market duopoly) yields the following result:
Proposition 5. Investment incentives are strictly larger under a perfectly competi-
tive labour market (ρ = ∗) than under coordinated (ρ = C) or decentralised wage-setting
(ρ = D). However, investment incentives are larger under centralised wage setting
(ρ = U) than under perfectly competitive labour markets (ρ = ∗)i fw0 <A / 4.F o r
all A/4 <w 0 <Athere exists a threshold value ∆∗ such that I∗ >I U if ∆ < ∆∗ and
I∗ <I U if ∆ > ∆∗. Moreover, ∆∗ is monotonically increasing in w0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that unionisation can in fact carry larger investments incentives
than perfectly competitive labour markets. This, however, is only the case for completely
centralised wage setting where the risk of a hold-up through wage diﬀerentiation is
completely eliminated. As unionisation leads to a wage rate above the competitive
wage, ﬁrms face a more elastic demand for their products, which can induce higher
investment activity under unionisation. If, however, the reservation wage is suﬃciently
large, this eﬀect vanishes and a perfectly competitive market is likely to exhibit larger
17See also Katz (1993) who reports that unions have frequently supported moves towards decentral-
isation. A related point has been made by Lindbeck and Snower (2001) who show that recent trends
towards more ﬂexible production techniques correspond with an increasing resistence against centralised
bargaining structures.
15investment incentives, as the wage level hold-up reduces ﬁrms’ investment incentives
under unionisation. As Proposition 5 also states slightly more ﬂexible wage-setting
institutions result in strictly lower investment incentives compared to the benchmark
case.
5 Labour Market Policy Implications
What are the implications our model has for labour market policy? At the latest since
Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) the question of the optimal degree of wage-setting cen-
tralisation has been most contentious and subject to a vigorous debate. The central
questions are how labour market organisation aﬀects unemployment on the one hand
and productivity on the other, and relatedly, whether a change in labour market pol-
icy can induce more favourable outcomes. While quite a number of economists argue
that labour market rigidities and centralised wage-setting institutions are at the root of
the unemployment problem and also responsible for the poor economic performance of
many European countries (see, e.g., Siebert 1997), others point at the positive dynamic
eﬃciency eﬀects as ﬁrms have stronger incentives to increase their labour productivity
when labour markets are less ﬂexible (see, e.g., Kleinknecht 1998). While the ﬁrst line of
reasoning is regularly put forward by economic experts such as the council of economic
advisers in Germany (see, e.g., Sachverständigenrat 1998, 117-127), union representa-
tives usually concur with the second argument and claim that wage diﬀerentiation opens
the window for wage dumping (Schmutzkonkurrenz), which reduces ﬁrms’ incentives to
increase their labour productivity (see, e.g., Flassbeck and Scheremet 1995 or Soltwedel
1997). Similar arguments have also been put forward in the Swedish debate over “soli-
daristic” bargaining (see Rehn 1952).
As we have demonstrated in our model, there may be some truth in both lines of
reasoning, depending on the severity of the hold-up problem, the nature of innovation,
and other factors such as workers’ reservation wage. Therefore, and since policy makers
usually care about both employment eﬀects and investment/productivity, it is useful to
summarise our results for policy purposes as follows:18
Remark 1. Depending on the investment project I(∆) we obtain the following
results:
(i) For ID <I(∆) <I U centralised wage setting under a uniformity rule (U) provides
the largest investment incentives but results in lower employment than regime D.
18Using the results of Lemma 2 it is easily established that employment (i.e., q1(1−∆)+q2) is largest
under regime D. As Assumption 1 holds, this is also true if an investment project is not undertaken
under D but under U.
16(ii) Otherwise, decentralised wage setting maximises employment while not aﬀecting
investment.
In light of Remark 1, an extension of antitrust rules to labour markets, as called for by
some economists (see, e.g., Baird 2000 and Haucap et al. 2001), may not be unwarranted.
A strict application of antitrust rules would mean that the formation of industry-wide
unions and collective wage agreements were not allowed due to their monopolisation
eﬀects. While such a prohibition may imply lower productivity, our model predicts that
employment would increase. If, however, the creation of monopoly unions is allowed
for some reason, another antitrust rule may come into force, namely non-discrimination
rules. The requirement not to discriminate between ﬁrms would increase investment
incentives without lowering employment in our model.
In summary, policy makers may face a trade-oﬀ between more employment and higher
productivity in case (i) of Remark 1. Interestingly though, allowing for an industry union
and wage ﬂexibility at the ﬁrm-level is never optimal for policy makers who care about
both employment and productivity. Hence, in the light of our model labour market
policy may be well advised either to restrict union formation altogether or to impose
non-discrimination rules on collective wage agreements. Based on these accounts, we
are left with the uncomfortable ﬁnding that labour markets are nevertheless exempted
from antitrust law.19
Even if the application of antitrust laws to labour markets is not a politically viable
option, our model casts severe doubts on the merits that slightly more ﬂexible wage
institutions, which allow for diﬀerentiated wage proﬁles (e.g., through opting out clauses)
may have in highly centralised labour markets. In the light of our model, introducing
intermediate levels of centralisation appear to be the worst policy option available, not
only on an economy-wide basis as stated by Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988), but also on an
industry-wide level.
6C o n c l u s i o n
A sw eh a v es h o w ni nt h i sp a p e r ,ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in productivity enhancing
technology are non—monotone in the degree of wage-setting centralisation at the in-
19For the European Union and, e.g., Germany there is no dispute that the labour market is com-
pletely exempted from antitrust regulations (see, e.g., Rittner 1999). While in the United States the
Penningtion case has proved that antitrust laws can be imposed on agreements beween unions and
employers, the overall picture is similar as in Europe (for an assessment of the US situation see, e.g.,
Sullivan and Grimes 2000, pp. 716-727).
17dustry level.20 If coordinated wage-setting is combined with strict uniform wage rules
investment incentives are largest, while coordinated wage setting alone performs worst
in terms of innovative activity. Our results, therefore, suggest to distinguish coordinated
wage regimes along the lines of wage ﬂexibility. For this purpose, it should prove useful
that the degree of centralisation is monotone in the interﬁrm wage diﬀerential, which
suggests that it should be used as an explanatory variable in a reduced form approach.
While it is conventional wisdom that rigidities in European labour markets are the
main cause for the high unemployment in Europe, we would also point to the commit-
ment value that these rigidities provide, as they help to reduce the hold-up problem
associated with unionism. Since the conventional arguments for labour market dereg-
ulation are based on a static framework without innovation, they fail to capture the
commitment aspects associated with diﬀerent forms of labour market organisation. In
contrast, our paper has analysed the strategic incentives to innovate under diﬀerent
modes of labour market organisation and we argued that “equal pay for equal work”
rules may be beneﬁcial as they can encourage innovation. In this case, policy makers face
at r a d e - o ﬀ between high employment and productivity when designing labour market
regulations and labour market policy more generally.
While we do not wish to over-emphasise this point, we believe that understanding
the institutional complementarities of labour market organisation and innovation is cru-
cial for discussing the eﬀects of labour market deregulation. The costs and beneﬁts of
labour market regulation are likely to be less clear-cut than is sometimes argued (see,
for example, Siebert, 1997). While decentralisation leads to higher employment levels in
our framework, it also reduces innovation incentives. In contrast, a highly inﬂexible and
centralised regime carries the highest innovation systems, but leads to lower employment
than a decentralised regime. An intermediate degree of centralisation with only some
(in)ﬂexibility appears to be especially undesirable in the light of our analysis.21
For our model, we have used the simplifying assumption that ﬁrms are initially
symmetric. If, however, we assume instead that ﬁrms are already asymmetric when
they decide about any investment, the natural question arises how wage-setting systems
aﬀect the evolution of oligopoly markets. While we have to leave a deﬁnite answer to
20The empirical literature is generally not conclusive on the relationship between various measures
of labour market rigidity and economic growth. The OECD, for example, recently concluded: “While
higher unionisation and more co-ordinated bargaining lead to less earnings inequality, it is more diﬃcult
to ﬁnd consistent and clear relationships between those key characterictics of collective bargaining
systems and aggregate employment, unemployment, or economic growth” (OECD 1996, p. 2).
21In fact, Bassanini and Ernst (2002) provide cross-country evidence that in countries with coordi-
nated wage-setting systems there is a negative relationship between R&D intensity and labour market
ﬂexibility, at least for high-technology industries.
18further research, we conjecture that centralised wage-setting under a uniformity rule is
likely to increase asymmetries between ﬁrms, while a decentralised system may give rise
to oﬀsetting eﬀects. Other areas for further research may be to fully endogenise the
choice of labour market institutions and to analyse investment incentives under diﬀerent
degrees of centralisation and diﬀerent bargaining patterns or union preferences.
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Appendix
Derivation of Condition (1) in Assumption 1.
22We ﬁrst derive condition (1), which is a suﬃcient condition that ensures that all ﬁrms
produce strictly positive output levels. Then we show that Assumption 1 guarantees
interior equilibrium outcomes such that the less eﬃcient ﬁrm 2 has a strictly positive
production quantity under all three unionisation structures.
Assume that we face regime U, and, for the moment, also suppose that ﬁrm 2 is
not active. Then, ﬁrm 1’s optimal choice in the third stage is given by q1(w,∆)=
[A − w(1 − ∆)]/2. Accordingly, the union sets w to maximise U =( 1− ∆)q1(w − w0)
which yields the optimal wage w(∆)=[ A + w0(1 − ∆)]/[2(1 − ∆)]. This, however,
cannot constitute an equilibrium outcome as long as ﬁrm 2’s labour demand remains
strictly positive. Firm 2’s best response function in the third stage of the game is given
by q2(q1,w)=m a x {A−q1−w)/2,0}, and by substituting q1(w,∆) and w(∆) we obtain
that q2(q1,w) > 0 if condition (1) holds. Hence, condition (1) is suﬃcient to exclude
corner solutions under regime U where only the eﬃcient ﬁrm stays in the market.
We next show that condition (1) guarantees interior solutions under all three union-
isation structures. Under the diﬀerent structures, ﬁrm 2’s equilibrium output levels
(which are given in Lemma 2) are strictly positive for w0 < wD
0 ≡ 5A/(5 + 2∆),
w0 < wC
0 ≡ A/(1 + ∆),a n dw0 < wU
0 ≡ (2 + 5∆2 − 5∆)A/[2(1 + ∆)(1− ∆ + ∆2)] for




As condition (1) is the most restrictive one, it ensures that ﬁrm 2 has strictly positive
output levels under all unionisation structures.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
We can obtain ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium proﬁt sd i r e c t l yf r o mL e m m a2a sΠ1 = q2
1 must




















(2 + 2∆2 + ∆)A − 2w0(1 − 2∆)(1− ∆ + ∆2)








Let us ﬁrst compare ID and IC. Using (5) and (6) yields that ID >I C if and only
if w0 < e w0 ≡ 55A/(55 + 29∆), which is implied by Assumption (1) since e w0 − w0 =
8A∆ 4∆+17




2(1−∆+∆2) and c ≡ 7∆w0/15. Then, we can rewrite equations (7) and (5)
as IU =( 8
9a + 4
9b) 9
16b and ID =( 8
9a + 4
9c)c.H e n c e ,f o rIU >I D it is suﬃcient to show
that 9b/16 >c , which reduces to w0 < 135A/[64(1 − ∆ + ∆2)], which is implied by
Assumption 1. Hence, IU >I D and, therefore, IU >I D >I C.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .




1(−∆) for ρ = D,C,U with “∆” indicating
that ﬁrm 1 holds the exclusive patent for the new technology and “−∆” indicating that
ﬁrm 2 holds the exclusive patent for the new technology. Let us ﬁrst compare P D and
PC.W eo b t a i nPD =4 w0∆(2(A−w0)+w0∆)/45,a n dPC = w0∆(2(A−w0)+w0∆)/12,
so that PD >PC if w0 < 2A
2−∆ which holds by Assumption 1.
Now let us turn to the comparison of P U and PD.D e ﬁne a ≡ (A − w0)/3, b ≡
2∆w0/3+A∆/[2(1 − ∆ + ∆2)], c ≡ 7∆w0/15, d ≡ 2∆w0/15 and e ≡ ∆w0/3+A∆(1−
∆)/[2(1 − ∆ + ∆2)]. We can write the investment incentives under regimes U and D as
follows: PU =( 2 ab + b2 +2 ae − e2)/4 and PD =4 ( 2 ac + c2 +2 ad − d2)/9.I t f o l l o w s
that PU >P D if and only if





For this condition to be satisﬁed, it is suﬃcient to show that the following two conditions
are jointly fulﬁlled:
2(b + e) >
32
9









Given that b+e = ∆w0 +
A∆(2−∆)
2(1−∆+∆2) and c+d =3 ∆w0/5,( 8 )h o l d sf o rw0 <
15A(2−∆)
2(1−∆+∆2),
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Hence, we know that (9) must be fulﬁlled if ∆2w0 [w0 + A(1 + ∆)/(1 − ∆ + ∆2)]/3 >
16(∆w0)2/45, which reduces to w0 <
5A(1+∆)
2(1−∆+∆2), which again holds by Assumption 1.
Hence, PU >PD f o l l o w s ,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,P U >P D >P C.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
An investment project I(∆) is undertaken under regime ρ (ρ = D,C,U)i fa n do n l y
I ≤ Iρ. Due to Proposition 1, we can restrict the analysis to the three cases stated
in the proposition. Regarding cases (i) and (iii) an investment project is undertaken
under every regime and under no regime, respectively. Consequently, it follows that the
wage-bill maximising regime is C in case (i) and C or U in case (iii). We can thus restrict
attention to the remaining case (ii).
Using Lemma 1 and 2 we can write the industry wage bills under the unionisation
24structures as
U
D(∆) = (100A(A − 2w0 + w0∆) + 100w
2













(A(2 − ∆) − 2w0(1 − ∆ + ∆2))2
24(1 − ∆ + ∆2)
.
We ﬁrst show that regime D is never optimal for workers. If a project I(∆) is not under-
taken under either D or C (i.e., I(∆) >I D), then C must be the wage-bill maximising
regime. Secondly, if a project is undertaken under D (and, thereby, also under U), but
not under C (i.e., I(∆) >I C), comparison of UU and UD yields that UU(∆) >U D(∆)
if and only if
φ1(∆,w 0)












Calculating ∂φ1(∆,w 0)/∂w0, we obtain that this is negative if w0 < 1
2
A(3∆+10)
5+3∆+∆2,w h i c h
holds by Assumption 1. Using again Assumption 1 we set w0 =
(1−3∆)A
1−∆2 which we
substitute into φ1(∆,w 0). This gives the expression (A∆)2(133 − 172∆ + 222∆2 −
44∆3 +5 ∆4)/(1 − ∆2)
2, which is strictly positive for all 0 < ∆ < 1/3.H e n c e ,f o rc a s e
(ii) only C and U can be optimal.
Comparing now the respective wage bills gives that UU(∆) − UC(0) is positive if
∆φ2(∆,w 0)
24(1 − ∆ + ∆2)
> 0, where (10)
φ2(∆,w 0)=4 Aw0(1 − ∆ + ∆
2) − 4w
2




As the denominator of (10) is strictly positive, the sign of UU(∆) − UC(0) is given by
the sign of φ2(∆,w 0). As this expression is quadratic in w0, we prove the existence of a
unique threshold e ∆(w0) > 0 such that φ2(e ∆(w0),w 0)=0in an indirect way. Note that
this also implies φ2(∆,w 0) > 0 for ∆ < e ∆ and φ2(∆,w 0) < 0 for ∆ > e ∆. Solving the





1 − ∆(1 − ∆) −
p
(1 − 5∆ +9 ∆2 − 8∆3 +4 ∆4)







1 − ∆(1 − ∆)+
p
(1 − 5∆ +9 ∆2 − 8∆3 +4 ∆4)
1 − 2∆ + ∆2(2 − ∆)
!
,
such that (10) holds if w0 >w 0,1 or w0 <w 0,2. Note, however, that w0,2 > w0(∆) for all
∆ ≥ 0.H e n c e ,w0 >w 0,2 can never hold. Now let us show that the term in brackets in
25(11) is monotonically increasing in ∆. Calculating its derivative reveals that the sign of
the derivative is determined by the expression
1
2
[1 + ∆ − 12∆2 +1 6 ∆3 − 8∆4]+2 Φ(1 − ∆ + ∆2)
(1 − ∆)[1− 2∆ +2 ∆2 − ∆3]Φ
(12)
with Φ =( 1− 2∆)
√
1 − ∆ + ∆2. We show that (12) is positive for all 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3.
Consider ﬁrst the term in rectangular brackets of the nominator and deﬁne it by ζ(∆).
Calculating the second derivative yields ζ
00(∆)=−24(1 − 4∆(1 − ∆)).A s ζ
00(∆) is
maximised at ∆ =1 /2, it is straightforward to check that ζ
00(∆) < 0 for all 0 ≤ ∆ <
1/3, which implies that ζ(∆) is strictly concave over this interval. Evaluating ζ(∆) at
the boundaries gives ζ(0) = 1 and ζ(1/3) = 40/81,s ot h a tζ(∆) is strictly positive
over 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3. Next consider the second term in rectangular brackets of the
denominator which we deﬁne by φ(∆).T h eﬁrst and second derivative of this term are
φ
0(∆)=−2+4 ∆ − 3∆2 and φ
00(∆)=2 ( 2− 3∆), respectively. It is immediate that
φ
00(∆) is strictly positive over 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1/3.E v a l u a t i n g φ
0(∆) at the lower boundary
φ
0(0) = −2 what implies that φ
0(∆) is strictly decreasing over 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1/3. Evaluating
now φ(∆) at the upper boundary ∆ =1 /3 gives φ(1/3) = 14/27 which is positive.
Hence, φ(∆) is strictly positive over the interval 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3.A s t h e o t h e r t e r m s
of (12) are also positive we have shown that the threshold value w0,1 is monotonically










> 0. Combining the values for w0,1 at the boundaries with the
monotonicity of w0,1 in ∆ proves the existence of the unique threshold value 0 < e ∆ < 1/3
for all 0 ≤ w0 ≤ A, and its monotonicity in w0 as stated in Proposition 4.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
We ﬁrst derive the second-best investment incentives I∗ with perfectly competitive
labour markets. Then we prove the second part of the assertion which compares I∗ and
IU.T h e nw ep r o v et h eﬁrst part of the proposition.
If the labour market is perfectly competitive, then the prevailing wage rate is w = w0.
Hence, ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium proﬁts are Π1(w0,∆)=( A − w0(1 − 2∆))2/9. Accordingly,
second-best investment incentives are deﬁned by I∗ = Π1(w0,∆) − Π1(w0,0) for which





48(1 − ∆ + ∆2)
2, with (13)
ψ1(∆,w 0)=A
2(4 − ∆ +4 ∆







2 +1 0 ∆
3 − 2 − 6∆
4 +2 ∆
5).
As the denominator is strictly positive the sign of IU − I∗ is positive if
ψ1(∆,w 0) > 0. (14)
26Condition (14) is quadratic in w0, which suggests an indirect way to prove the existence
of a unique threshold ∆∗(w0) > 0 such that ψ1(∆∗(w0),w 0)=0 . Note that this also
implies ψ1(∆,w 0) > 0 for ∆ > ∆∗ and ψ1(∆,w 0) < 0 for ∆ < ∆∗. Solving the quadratic





5 − 6∆ +4 ∆2 −
p
(16∆4 − 32∆3 +5 6 ∆2 − 40∆ +9 )







5 − 6∆ +4 ∆2 +
p
(16∆4 − 32∆3 +5 6 ∆2 − 40∆ +9 )
(1 − ∆)(1− ∆ + ∆2)
!
,
such that (14) holds if w0 <w 0,1 or w0 >w 0,2. First note that w0,2 > w0(∆) for all
∆ ≥ 0, so that the second inequality never holds. We next show that the term in
brackets in (15) is monotonically increasing in ∆. Calculating its derivative reveals that
the sign of the derivative is determined by the expression
£
2+4 8 ∆










with Ψ =( 1− 2∆)
p
(4∆2 − 4∆ +9 ) . We show that expression (16) is strictly positive
for all 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3. Consider the ﬁrst term in rectangular brackets which we denote by
ξ1. This term is strictly concave over 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3.22 Evaluating ξ1 at the boundaries
gives to positive values, so that ξ1 > 0 follows. As the remaining terms are also positive
over 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3 we can conclude that (16) is also positive, so that the threshold value
w0,1 is monotonically increasing in ∆.M o r e o v e r ,f o r∆ =0we obtain w0,1 = A/4 and






/112. Combining the values for w0,1 at
the boundaries with the monotonicity of w0,1 in ∆ proves the existence of the unique
threshold value 0 < ∆∗(w0) < 1/3 and its monotonicity in w0 for all A/4 <w 0 <Aas
asserted in the Proposition.
We ﬁnally show I∗ >I D holds for all 0 < ∆ < 1/3. First note that the diﬀerence
I∗ − ID is increasing in ∆,w h i c hf o l l o w sf o r m∂(I∗ − ID)/∂∆ = w0(620(A − w0)+
1408w0∆)/2025 > 0.F o r ∆ =0we get I∗ − ID =0 ,s ot h a tI∗ >I D holds for all
0 < ∆ < 1/3. By Proposition 2 it also follows that I∗ >I C.
22To see this, diﬀerentiate ξ1 successively with respect to ∆ and use the restriction 0 ≤ ∆ < 1/3.I t
then follows that ∂2ξ1/∂∆2 < 0 must hold.
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